Merleau-Ponty's «Phenomenology of Perception» suggests perception to be the primary level of the giveness of the world. Perception appears as always an incomplete synthesis of the plural, bringing together bodily and material aspects. Such the simplest interpretation of perception as rendering a contact within the dyad «body-world» is a preliminary axiom for explaining the rest of the process of noematic sense formation. At the same time, Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical intuitions clearly presuppose more, and perception is also thought of as the final (...) point where sense is already given by some way. Thus, in Phenomenology, the second interpretation of perception presumes it to be sense-giving accompanied by the tacit cogito. Merleau-Ponty suggests that these interpretations are compatible with each other, but the transition between them seems really problematic. In the research author shos that the limit of the initial synthesis of perception - some sense of the perceived (exemplyfing meanings as «this horse», «the green density that rushed towards me») - is unattainable from within perception itself and by its means. Perception is itself mediated by other faculties, such as memory, reflection, and imagination. Argumentation for this thesis is carried out in several ways; the relations in the perception/imagination pair show us the most characteristic case, where Merleau-Ponty, judging by later works, himself comes close to recognizing the limitations of the hypothesis of «the world of perception», to the need for a phenomenological development of the topic of faculties. Based on the application of the phenomenological method and the analysis of the conceptual constructions of Merleau-Ponty, we can conclude the following: «the world of perception» does not exist, but the phenomenology of faculties is demanded. (shrink)

This article discusses chapters 15 and 16 of the ancient midrash Leviticus Rabba and its view of leprosy. The phenomenon of Biblical leprosy is here not investigated from a paleopathological point of view. The focus lies on its physiological, actiological, pathological and therapeutic aspects as represented in Leviticus Rabba. It is argued that the medical views of Leviticus Rabba show a certain resemblance to some of the view of the Hippocratic School, notably with respect to humoral theory, the belief in (...) the correspondence between the macrocosm and the individual microcosm, and the notion of paideia as a way of healing. Finally, it is shown that the ancient myth of the two floods is connected to the understanding of leprosy in Leviticus Rabba. (shrink)

Beck uses the term `subpolitics' to refer to forms of politics outside and beyond the representative institutions of the political system of nation-states. From the perspective of the theory of reflexive modernization, the proliferation of subpolitics indicates a weakening of the `iron cage' of bureaucratic, state-oriented politics. We argue that subpolitics does indeed challenge conventional notions of politics. It mobilizes sources of societal influence that transcend the formal political system. In particular, subpolitics correlates with the command over positive or negative (...) sanctions and the capacity for uncertainty absorption. This can be illustrated in the areas of scientific expertise, corporate decision-making and political consumption. Those cases show that the political system cannot monopolize the means of societal influence. For a political system that regards itself as the centre of society, this must be irritating. For sociology, however, it provides the opportunity to part with such an inappropriate account of the role of politics in modern society. (shrink)

Instead of the usual asymptotic passage from quantum mechanics to classical mechanics when a parameter tended to infinity, a sharp boundary is obtained for the domain of existence of classical reality. The last is treated as separable empirical reality following d'Espagnat, described by a mathematical superstructure over quantum dynamics for the universal wave function. Being empirical, this reality is constructed in terms of both fundamental notions and characteristics of observers. It is presupposed that considered observers perceive the world as a (...) system of collective degrees of freedom that are inherently dissipative because of interaction with thermal degrees of freedom. Relevant problems of foundation of statistical physics are considered. A feasible example is given of a macroscopic system not admitting such classical reality.The article contains a concise survey of some relevant domains: quantum and classical Bell-type inequalities; universal wave function; approaches to quantum description of macroscopic world, with emphasis on dissipation; spontaneous reduction models; experimental tests of the universal validity of the quantum theory. (shrink)

In his article "How Certain Boundaries and Ethics Diminish Therapeutic Effectiveness", Lazarus asserts that many clinicians are adhering to strict therapeutic boundaries and ethics in a fear-driven effort to avoid unwarranted malpractice claims. Although I agree that maintenance of conventional therapeutic boundaries is apt to minimize malpractice claims in most cases, I believe that is because such boundaries are critical to protect patients' welfare and thereby promote effective treatment. My reasoning, discussed next, revolves around the following premises: 1. For many, (...) if not most, types of patient problems and patient populations, boundaries and the personal meaning of the therapeutic boundaries are an arena in which critical emotional issues are manifested and worked through. 2. Clear, consistent boundaries provide a structure and safety for many patients that is a curative factor in itself. 3. Patients' reactions to alterations in usual therapeutic boundaries are often unpredictable ahead of time (even if requested by the patient) and typically complex, ambivalent, and heavily colored by transferential meaning. 4. Because alterations in therapeutic boundaries typically add a new therapist role or activity that involves potential gratification of personal needs of the therapist, objectivity in evaluating such a change may be compromised by the inherent self-interest. 5. Consistent, clear boundaries need have no impact on therapist warmth and empathy. (shrink)

"Seymon Lyudvigovich Frank, the author of the volume here made available for the first time in English translation, was one of the leading Russian philosophers of this century; some authorities consider him the most outstanding Russian philosopher of any age...._ " _Man's Soul__ is a book which perfectly exemplifies the generous conception of the mission and competence of philosophy characteristic of Frank and the other members of the Russian metaphysical movement. Frank's stated aim in the treatise is to reclaim for (...) philosophy a field of investigation which, from the time of Plato and Aristotle to that of the Russian Idealists, philosophers had viewed as properly theirs, but which, since the mid-nineteenth century, they had allowed to fall into almost complete neglect: the study of the nature of the human soul...._ "The moral message of _Man's Soul__ is well summed up by its epigraph, quoted from St. Augustine: 'Let man first of all return to his own self, so that once he has, as it were, stepped therein, he may rise from thence and be elevated to God.'" -- from the foreword by Philip J. Swoboda. (shrink)

Our current culture is dominated by the ideology of creativity. One is supposed to create the new and not to care about the things as they are. This ideology legitimises the domination of the "creative class" over the rest of the population that is predominantly occupied by forms of care - medical care, child care, agriculture, industrial maintenance and so on. We have a responsibility to care for our own bodies, but here again our culture tends to thematize the bodies (...) of desire and to ignore the bodies of care - ill bodies in need of self-care and social care. But the discussion of care has a long philosophical tradition. The book retraces some episodes of this tradition - beginning with Plato and ending with Alexander Bogdanov through Hegel, Heidegger, Bataille and many others. The central question discussed is: who should be the subject of care? Should I care for myself or trust the others, the system, the institutions? Here, the concept of the self-care becomes a revolutionary principle that confronts the individual with the dominating mechanisms of control. (shrink)

Crucial texts, many available in English for the first time, written before and during the Bolshevik Revolution by the radical biopolitical utopianists of Russian Cosmism. Cosmism emerged in Russia before the October Revolution and developed through the 1920s and 1930s; like Marxism and the European avant-garde, two other movements that shared this intellectual moment, Russian Cosmism rejected the contemplative for the transformative, aiming to create not merely new art or philosophy but a new world. Cosmism went the furthest in its (...) visions of transformation, calling for the end of death, the resuscitation of the dead, and free movement in cosmic space. This volume collects crucial texts, many available in English for the first time, by the radical biopolitical utopianists of Russian Cosmism. Cosmism was developed by the Russian philosopher Nikolai Fedorov in the late nineteenth century; he believed that humans had an ethical obligation not only to care for the sick but to cure death using science and technology; outer space was the territory of both immortal life and infinite resources. After the revolution, a new generation pursued Fedorov's vision. Cosmist ideas inspired visual artists, poets, filmmakers, theater directors, novelists (Tolstoy and Dostoevsky read Fedorov's writings), architects, and composers, and influenced Soviet politics and technology. In the 1930s, Stalin quashed Cosmism, jailing or executing many members of the movement. Today, when the philosophical imagination has again become entangled with scientific and technological imagination, the works of the Russian Cosmists seem newly relevant. Contributors Alexander Bogdanov, Alexander Chizhevsky, Nikolai Fedorov, Boris Groys, Valerian Muravyev, Alexander Svyatogor, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, Anton Vidokle, Brian Kuan Wood A copublication with e-flux, New York. (shrink)

Philosophy is traditionally understood as the search for universal truths, and philosophers are supposed to transmit those truths beyond the limits of their own culture. But, today, we have become skeptical about the ability of an individual philosopher to engage in "universal thinking," so philosophy seems to capitulate in the face of cultural relativism. In Introduction to Antiphilosophy, Boris Groys argues that modern "antiphilosophy" does not pursue the universality of thought as its goal but proposes in its place the (...) universality of life, material forces, social practices, passions, and experiences --angst, vitality, ecstasy, the gift, revolution, laughter or "profane illumination" --and he analyzes this shift from thought to life and action in the work of thinkers from Kierkegaard to Derrida, from Nietzsche to Benjamin. Ranging across the history of modern thought, Introduction to Antiphilosophy endeavors to liberate philosophy from the stereotypes that hinder its development. --Publisher. (shrink)

The leading art theorist takes on art in the age of the Internet In the early twentieth century, art and its institutions came under critique from a new democratic and egalitarian spirit. The notion of works of art as sacred objects was decried and subsequently they would be understood merely as things. This meant an attack on realism, as well as on the traditional preservative mission of the museum. Acclaimed art theorist Boris Groys argues this led to the development (...) of “direct realism”: an art that would not produce objects, but practices (from performance art to relational aesthetics) that would not survive. But for more than a century now, every advance in this direction has been quickly followed by new means of preserving art’s distinction. In this major new work, Groys charts the paradoxes produced by this tension, and explores art in the age of the thingless medium, the Internet. Groys claims that if the techniques of mechanical reproduction gave us objects without aura, digital production generates aura without objects, transforming all its materials into vanishing markers of the transitory present. (shrink)

«Теоретики русского космизма призвали человечество к установлению тотальной власти над космосом и к обеспечению индивидуального телесного бессмертия для каждого живущего или жившего раньше человека. Надо сказать, что телесное бессмертие обычно воспринималось христианской культурой как проклятие. Достаточно вспомнить фигуру Франкенштейна или Голема. «Человеческие» герои романа Брэма Стокера «Дракула» (написанного, кстати, в 1897 году, почти одновременно с «Философией общего дела» Николая Федорова) изо всех сил защищают свое право на естественную смерть. Однако с тех пор в западной массовой культуре к вампирам и зомби (...) стали относиться намного лучше. Лишенное веры в бессмертие души, современное человечество все больше очаровывается перспективой телесного бессмертия. И этот поворот осуществляется не только в массовой культуре, о чем свидетельствуют недавние дискуссии о постгуманизме. В исторической перспективе теории русского космизма представляются началом этой переоценки ценности телесного бессмертия – переоценки, которая не завершена и по сей день». Борис Гройс. (shrink)

I propose a general alethic theory of epistemic risk according to which the riskiness of an agent’s credence function encodes her relative sensitivity to different types of graded error. After motivating and mathematically developing this approach, I show that the epistemic risk function is a scaled reflection of expected inaccuracy. This duality between risk and information enables us to explore the relationship between attitudes to epistemic risk, the choice of scoring rules in epistemic utility theory, and the selection of priors (...) in Bayesian epistemology more generally. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Kant adopted, throughout his career, a position that is much more akin to classical accounts of epigenesis, although he does reject the more radical forms of epigenesis proposed in his own time, and does make use of preformationist sounding terms. I argue that this is because Kant thinks of what is pre-formed as a species, not an individual or a part of an individual; has no qualm with the idea of a specific, teleological principle (...) or force underlying generation, and conceives of germs and predispositions as specific constraints on such a principle or force. Neither of these conceptions of what is “preformed”, I argue, is in strict opposition to classical epigenesis. I further suggest that Kant’s lingering use of preformationist terminology is due to his belief that this is required to account for the specificity of the specific generative force; his resistance towards the unrestricted plasticity of the generative force in radical epigenesis, which violates species-fixism; and his insistence on the internal, organic basis of developmental plasticity and variation within species. I conclude by suggesting that this terminological and interpretative peculiarity is partly due to a larger shift in the natural philosophical concerns surrounding the debate on epigenesis and preformation. Specifically, it is a sign that the original reasons for resisting epigenesis, namely its use of specific, teleological principles and its commitment to the natural production of biological structure, became less of a concern, whereas unrestricted plasticity and its undermining of fixism became a real issue, thereby also becoming the focal point of the debate. (shrink)

In this paper we develop a general theory of algorithmic fairness. Drawing on Johnson King and Babic’s work on moral encroachment, on Gary Becker’s work on labor market discrimination, and on Strawson’s idea of resentment and indignation as responses to violations of the demand for goodwill toward oneself and others, we locate attitudes to fairness in an agent’s utility function. In particular, we first argue that fairness is a matter of a decision-maker’s relative concern for the plight of people from (...) different groups, rather than of the outcomes produced for different groups. We then show how an agent’s preferences, including in particular their attitudes to error, give rise to their decision thresholds. Tying these points together, we argue that the agent’s relative degrees of concern for different groups manifest in a difference in decision thresholds applied to these groups. (shrink)

In this handbook, I put into practice my philosophical views on children's mathematics. The handbook contains brief instructions and examples of mathematical activities. In the INSTRUCTIONS section, instructions are given on how, and in part why that way, to help preschool children in their mathematical development. In the ACTIVITIES section, there are examples of activities through which the child develops her mathematical abilities.

Starting from the idea that functions are formally similar to actions in that they are described and explained in a similar way, so that both admit of an accordion effect, I turn to Anscombe’s insight that the point of practical reasoning is to render explicit the relation between the different descriptions of an action generated by the accordion effect. The upshot is, roughly, that an item has a function if what it does can be accounted for by functional reasoning. Put (...) differently, a part of a system has a function if what it does is a functional part of what the system does. (shrink)

Many philosophers have argued that statistical evidence regarding group characteristics (particularly stereotypical ones) can create normative conflicts between the requirements of epistemic rationality and our moral obligations to each other. In a recent article, Johnson-King and Babic argue that such conflicts can usually be avoided: what ordinary morality requires, they argue, epistemic rationality permits. In this article, we show that as data get large, Johnson-King and Babic’s approach becomes less plausible. More constructively, we build on their project and develop a (...) generalized model of reasoning about stereotypes under which one can indeed avoid normative conflicts, even in a big data world, when data contain some noise. In doing so, we also articulate a general approach to rational belief updating for noisy data. (shrink)

In this paper, we reflect on the connection between the notions of organism and organisation, with a specific interest in how this bears upon the issue of the reality of the organism. We do this by presenting the case of Buffon, who developed complex views about the relation between the notions of “organised” and “organic” matter. We argue that, contrary to what some interpreters have suggested, these notions are not orthogonal in his thought. Also, we argue that Buffon has a (...) view in which organisation is not just ubiquitous, but basic and fundamental in nature, and hence also fully natural. We suggest that he can hold this view because of his anti-mathematicism. Buffon’s case is interesting, in our view, because he can regard organisation, and organisms, as perfectly natural, and can admit their reality without invoking problematic supernaturalist views, and because he allows organisation and the organismal to come in kinds and degrees. Thus, his view tries to do justice to two cautionary notes for the debate on the reality of the organism: the need for a commitment to a broadly naturalist perspective, and the need to acknowledge the interesting features of organisms through which we make sense of them. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the historical context and systematic importance of Kant's hypothetical use of reason. It does so by investigating the role of hypotheses in Kant's philosophy of science. We first situate Kant’s account of hypotheses in the context of eighteenth-century German philosophy of science, focusing on the works of Wolff, Meier, and Crusius. We contrast different conceptions of hypotheses of these authors and elucidate the different theories of probability informing them. We then adopt a more systematic perspective to discuss (...) Kant's idea that scientific hypotheses must articulate real possibilities. We argue that Kant's views on the intelligibility of scientific hypotheses constitute a valuable perspective on scientific understanding and the constraints it imposes on scientific rationality. (shrink)

The game Gls(κ) is played on a complete Boolean algebra B, by two players. White and Black, in κ-many moves (where κ is an infinite cardinal). At the beginning White chooses a non-zero element p ∈ B. In the α-th move White chooses pα ∈ (0.p)p and Black responds choosing iα ∈ {0.1}. White wins the play iff $\bigwedge _{\beta \in \kappa}\bigvee _{\alpha \geq \beta }p_{\alpha}^{i\alpha}=0$ , where $p_{\alpha}^{0}=p_{\alpha}$ and $p_{\alpha}^{1}=p\ p_{\alpha}$ . The corresponding game theoretic properties of c.B.a.'s are (...) investigated. So. Black has a winning strategy (w.s) if κ ≥ π(B) or if B contains a κ -closed dense subset. On the other hand, if White has a w.s., then κ ∈ [h₂(B). π(B)). The existence of w.s. is characterized in a combinatorial way and in terms of forcing. In particular, if 2κ = κ ∈ Reg and forcing by B preserves the regularity of κ, then White has a w.s. iff the power 2κ is collapsed to κ in some extension. It is shown that, under the GCH, for each set S ⊆ Reg there is a c.B.a. B such that White (respectively. Black) has a w.s. for each infinite cardinal κ ∈ S (resp. κ ∉ S). Also it is shown consistent that for each κ ∈ Reg there is a c.B.a. on which the game Gls(κ) is undetermined. (shrink)

The game is played on a complete Boolean algebra in ω-many moves. At the beginning White chooses a non-zero element p of and, in the nth move, White chooses a positive pn

(...) positive Maharam submeasure or contains a countable dense subset, then Black has a winning strategy in the game played on . A Suslin algebra on which the game is undetermined is constructed and the game is compared with the well-known cut-and-choose games , and introduced by Jech. (shrink)

While there are satisfactory answers to the question “How should we teach children mathematics?”, there are no satisfactory answers to the question “What mathematics should we teach children?”. This paper provides an answer to the last question for preschool children (early childhood), although the answer is also applicable to older children. This answer, together with an appropriate methodology on how to teach mathematics, gives a clear conception of the place of mathematics in the children’s world and our role in helping (...) children develop their mathematical abilities. Briefly, children’s mathematics consists of the world of children’s internal activities that they eventually purposefully organize in order to understand and control the outside world and organize their overall activities in it. We need to support a child in mathematical activities that she does spontaneously and in which she shows interest, and we need to teach her mathematics that she is interested in developing through these activities. In doing so, we must be fully aware that the child’s mathematics is part of the child’s world of internal activities and is not outside of it. We help the child develop mathematical abilities by developing them in the context of her world and not outside of it. From the point of view of this conception, the standards established today are limiting and too focused on numbers and geometric figures: these topics are too prominent and elaborated, and other mathematical contents are subordinated to them. Adhering to the standards, we drastically limit the mathematics of the child’s world, hamper the correct mathematical development of a child, and we can turn her away from mathematics. (shrink)

This paper discusses a novel problem at the intersection of ethics and epistemology: there can be cases in which moral considerations seem to "encroach'' upon belief from multiple directions at once, and possibly to varying degrees, thereby leaving their overall effect on belief unclear. We introduce these cases -- cases of moral encroachment under moral uncertainty -- and show that they pose a problem for all predominant accounts of moral encroachment. We then address the problem, by developing a modular Bayesian (...) framework that, we argue, is sufficiently flexible and scaleable to accommodate the multifaceted uncertainty we describe while still generating clear recommendations for an agent's beliefs. Our framework has several practical upshots, and we close by articulating them: we derive insights about the relationship between moral character and doxastic behavior and make suggestions for how to encourage people to revise their doxastic states in morally laudable ways, without deviating from core Bayesian norms. (shrink)

There are many examples of human speciesism prejudice toward their specie and neglect toward members of other species. This article will consider one example of speciesism, the keeping of animals in captivity in ZOOs. Legal norms concerning animal protection in ZOOs are described, emphasising criminal and misdemeanour charges brought up for animal negligence and/or animal torture and their euthanasia. Although the ZOO establishment and functioning, as well as animal protection within ZOO, is legally prescribed, the article affirmed Visković’s thought that (...) not even in the most prosperous societies “there is no real moral or legal discipline in keeping and exhibiting captive fauna”. Speciesism believes justifying ZOO existence will be morally and ethically reexamined. Speciesism could be found in malicious language constructions affirmed in semantical field zoological garden in the Croatian language. (shrink)

In this paper, I make a contribution to a naturalistically-minded theory of truthmakers by proposing a solution to the nasty problem of truthmakers for negative truths. After formulating the difficulty, I consider and reject a number of solutions to the problem, including Armstrong's states of affairs of totality, incompatibility accounts, and JC Beall 's polarity view. I then defend the position that absences of truthmakers are real and are responsible for making negative truths true. According to the positive account of (...) absences I offer, absences of contingent states of affairs are causally relevant mind-independent features of the physical world, located within space and time, and capable of being discovered by scientific inquiry. Recognition of the reality of absences strengthens truthmaker theory as a naturalistic metaphysics, as truth and falsity of each and every contingent proposition finds an ontological grounding in some region of the physical universe. (shrink)